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CHAPTER 8




On 15 April 2013, President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson of Iceland attended 
a National Press Club luncheon in New York. He was there to present his 
vision of a new international assembly for the Arctic, to be known as the 
‘Arctic Circle’. The primary aim of the assembly would be to ‘strengthen 
the policymaking process by bringing together as many Arctic and interna-
tional players as possible under one large tent’ (Webb 2013). The analogy 
of the ‘tent’ was intriguing because it raised interesting questions about 
how large the tent would be, how stable it might be and how it would be 
accessed (including who or what would control this access). Moreover, 
if, as President Grímsson claimed, the Assembly was to be an ‘open tent’, 
then it raised further questions about whether there were ‘closed tents’ 
elsewhere, populating the international polar landscape. In other words, 
there was, according to the President, evidence elsewhere that ‘the Arctic 
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has suffered from a lack of global awareness and, as a result, a lack of effec-
tive governance’ (Webb 2013).
Participants in this new vista of the ‘open tent’ were to be drawn from 
‘institutional and governmental representatives, political and policy lead-
ers, scientists and experts, activists, and indigenous peoples from the Arctic 
countries, as well as Asia, Europe and other parts of the world’ (Webb 
2013). In short, the Arctic Circle Assembly was to be a forum where virtu-
ally anyone who had something to say about the future of the Arctic could 
have a voice. As President Grímsson elaborated in conversation with Scott 
Borgerson, who has penned a number of provocative essays about the 
future of the Arctic in the journal Foreign Affairs (for instance, Borgerson 
2008), just after the National Press Club luncheon:
It will, for example, be a testing ground where South Korea can justify, why 
is it so interested in the Arctic? Why does the leadership of South Korea 
visit Greenland? Why does the prime minister of China talk about the Arctic 
when he comes to Iceland? What is the agenda? I was in India a few weeks 
ago. The first item on the meeting with the foreign minister of India was 
India’s desire to be a member of the Arctic Council. It’s kind of crazy, para-
doxical, that now I have to discuss in Delhi their membership in the Arctic 
Council. So in order to take the pressure off the Arctic Council membership, 
so to speak, this gathering—which we call The Arctic Circle, is partly a play 
of words of geographical location and having everybody sitting around the 
table, irrespective of protocol of [sic] power position—to broaden this dia-
logue and make it more inclusive and more effective. (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2013)
The timing of Grímsson’s announcement posed an important provoca-
tion to the Arctic Council, the primary intergovernmental forum for 
the Arctic region, which was due to convene for its eighth Ministerial 
meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, only four weeks later (Steinberg and Dodds 
2015). The Ministerial was expected to rule on whether a consensus 
could be reached among the eight Arctic states to expand the list of 
accredited observers to the Arctic Council to include China, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, India, Italy and the European Union (EU) (as 
well as a number of non- governmental organisations and other interest 
groups such as Greenpeace and the Oil and Gas Producers Association). 
There was a palpable feeling at the time that Grímsson was challenging 
the Arctic Council to take on a more global profile, with a view that 
should the Arctic Council reject the observer applicants, then the Arctic 
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Circle would be prepared to provide an alternative platform for global 
interest to be expressed in the Arctic (Koring 2013). As the Canadian 
Globe and Mail newspaper concluded,
Mr. Grímsson was careful to say that the Arctic Circle was not intended as 
a rival or replacement for the Arctic Council. But just as Davos—the high- 
profile annual gathering of political and business leaders, celebrities and 
NGOs—often eclipses more staid and official fora, it is clear that the Arctic 
Circle is intended as a high-profile, dynamic conference where India and 
Google and Greenpeace—and countless others with a stake in the Arctic—
need not wait for years hoping they may be allowed to speak. (Koring 2013; 
see also Quaile 2013)
What Grímsson did not say (but might have been thinking) was that the 
Arctic Circle initiative also had the potential to reposition Iceland as a 
gateway for the expression of global interests in the Arctic. On the same 
day that Grímsson presented his initiative, the Icelandic government 
signed a free trade agreement with China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2013). The agreement followed a period of deepening economic rela-
tions (promoted by Grímsson) between Iceland and China, spurred on 
by the US military withdrawal in 2006 and the Icelandic banking crisis 
between 2008 and 2011 which led to a breakdown in relations with the 
EU. Iceland–China relations were further symbolised in 2012 by moves 
such as the visit of China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, the signing of a bilat-
eral Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, the opening of a new 
Chinese embassy building in Reykjavik and the visit of the Snow Dragon, 
China’s only icebreaker, which had been carrying a Chinese Arctic science 
expedition (CHINARE 5) through the Northeast Passage (Tatlow 2012). 
Two months after the announcement of the Arctic Circle initiative, news 
broke that the Icelandic firm Eykon Energy was teaming up with China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation to explore for oil in the Arctic around 
the island of Jan Mayen.1
Yet the involvement of Alaskan and Greenlandic partners (and less 
explicitly, the Faroe Islands) suggests the Arctic Circle initiative was about 
more than Iceland’s blossoming relationship with China—it also posi-
tioned Iceland as the gateway to what we might describe as a ‘network of 
the marginalised’. Among the founding partners was Alice Rogoff, who 
founded Alaska Dispatch, a leading newspaper in Alaska, the USA’s only 
state with Arctic territory. One of Alaska’s two senators, Lisa Murkowski, 
was also appointed to the Arctic Circle’s honorary advisory board. Both 
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Lisa Murkowski and Alaska’s other Senator, Mark Begich, gave presen-
tations at the inaugural meeting of the Arctic Circle in October 2013. 
Alaskan involvement in the Arctic Circle from the outset is suggestive of 
concerns that Alaska has historically had a limited voice in Arctic affairs, 
with US Arctic policy being directed at the federal level in Washington, 
DC (McGwin 2015). The other founding partner from the Arctic was 
the former Greenlandic Premier Kuupik Kleist. Greenlandic officials have 
also been actively seeking an independent voice in Arctic affairs, distinct 
from that of the Danish government (Nunatsiaq News 2013). Alaskan, 
Greenlandic and Icelandic stakeholders therefore had common cause to 
support the Arctic Circle initiative as a way to reposition themselves geo-
politically as important Arctic players willing to reach out to Asian states, 
on the one hand, and to Western corporations, such as Google, on the 
other. For Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the Arctic Circle 
would also provide a space to bring greater attention to the West Nordic 
Council, a parliamentary forum established in 1985 which has recently 
called for the three governments to align their Arctic policy interests and 
create a West Nordic free trade area to strengthen the regional econ-
omy and expand export capabilities in order to reach global markets, 
ending their traditional reliance on European markets (Gudjonsson and 
Nielsson 2015).
The attempt to use the Arctic Circle initiative to reposition Iceland as a 
gateway for the expression of both global and marginalised interests in the 
Arctic is indicative, moreover, of concerns within the country that its own 
influence in the region is under threat (Dodds and Ingimundarson 2012). 
Iceland was, for example, excluded from meetings of the so-called Arctic 
Five in 2008 and 2009, and more recently the Arctic Five fisheries discus-
sions in 2014, because it was not considered to be an Arctic Ocean littoral 
state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). Having rejected EU membership 
for the foreseeable future, and lacking the financial muscle and littoral 
geography of Norway, Iceland appears alone in Europe (unlike Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland) (Lund 2015). Canada, the USA, and Russia mean-
while are all large enough to act independently. It is perhaps unsurprising 
then that Iceland has looked to make common cause with other isolated 
actors in Alaska, Greenland and the Faroe Islands in order to collectively 
boost their profile, while at the same time nurturing relationships with 
Arctic stakeholders in the wider international community (including Prince 
Albert II of Monaco, Abu Dhabi, China, the UK, Google, Guggenheim 
and the MacArthur Foundation, among many others).2
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If indeed the Arctic Circle initiative is an attempt to reposition Iceland 
(and to a much lesser extent Alaska, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) 
geopolitically as a gateway for the expression of global and marginalised 
interests in the Arctic, then it is not an unusual approach to take. The 
number of international forums where Arctic issues are discussed has 
increased dramatically in recent years (including, e.g., Arctic Frontiers, 
the International Arctic Forum, Arctic Imperative and Arctic Encounters). 
However, the significance of these forums remains relatively understudied 
in the literature on Arctic governance, reflecting the traditional preoccu-
pation of International Relations (IR) theory with state actors and state- 
based institutions, intergovernmental forums such as the Arctic Council 
and the Barents-Euro Arctic Council (BEAC), and sub-governmental 
organisations such as the Northern Forum (NF). Yet such conferences 
blur the lines between governance and dialogue—while the Arctic Circle 
and other initiatives do not ‘govern’ in the traditional sense, they have 
emerged as important sites for the sharing and contesting of ideas and 
practices about the present and future geopolitical make-up of the Arctic.
This blurring is evident from the close involvement of national gov-
ernments in these forums. Both Norway (Arctic Frontiers) and Russia 
(International Arctic Forum), for example, directly fund annual inter-
national conferences on the Arctic which are positioned as critical to 
setting the terms of debate about the future of the Arctic. Such meet-
ings also take place internationally—in London alone, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Canada and the USA have all funded workshops and conferences 
on Arctic geopolitics through their diplomatic missions.3 In addition to 
the opportunities to exchange ideas directly between stakeholders, such 
forums also provide a performance space for government officials to 
project their national interests in the Arctic in a certain light, either, for 
example, to remind others of the primacy of Arctic states and peoples or 
to demonstrate the legitimate interests of other stakeholders from beyond 
the region.
What is interesting to us in this chapter, then, is not the fact that yet 
another forum for dialogue about Arctic governance has been created, but 
more that the Arctic Circle offers an explicit example of the oft-ignored 
‘bazaar-like’ features of Arctic governance, broadly understood as an 
assemblage of intergovernmental institutions, international forums, and 
international/national/sub-national stakeholders. While such an assem-
blage may sound bizarre to some, our point is that initiatives such as the 
Arctic Circle are important for the exchange (i.e., buying and selling) of 
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knowledge and ideas between different international, national and sub- 
national stakeholders about what kind of space the Arctic is, and how it 
should be governed, even though they are not defined as ‘institutions’ in 
the formal sense traditionally associated with IR Theory.
Our notion of the ‘bazaar’ is also suggestive of the way in which, con-
trary to how the Arctic governance regime has traditionally been imagined 
by IR scholars (Young 2008, 2012), initiatives such as the Arctic Circle 
provide different sites of performance and practice wherein stakehold-
ers might seek to influence the Arctic governance regime in ways which 
might not be permissible elsewhere, for example, at the Arctic Council 
where non-Arctic states and other organisations have no voice in decision- 
making. By this, we are not trying to argue that the Arctic Circle and 
similar initiatives are competing with the Arctic Council for the right to 
govern Arctic affairs, only that they are collectively part of an unregulated 
marketplace of ideas which could influence the Arctic governance regime 
from within (Ingimundarson 2014, pp.186–187).
In this chapter, we use empirical data gathered at the Arctic Circle meet-
ing in October 2014 to further investigate our claims about the bazaar-like 
qualities of Arctic governance. The first part of the chapter briefly reviews 
the recent literature on Arctic governance and shows that the dominant 
interpretation of the current regime is that the Arctic is a region governed 
by a ‘patchwork’ or ‘mosaic’ of institutions and legal instruments operat-
ing at multiple levels, while at the same time retaining some semblance 
of common purpose—namely to promote peace and cooperation in the 
Arctic. In accordance with this view, the Arctic Circle might simply be 
regarded as another piece of the jigsaw that produces this coherent whole. 
The second part of the chapter introduces our concept of the ‘bazaar’, 
which we have adapted from the work of the American anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz on the ‘bazaar economy’ (Geertz 1978). The third part 
of the chapter illustrates our argument about the bazaar-like features of 
Arctic governance from the perspective of the UK (one of the authors was 
fortunate enough to be part of the UK delegation to the Arctic Circle in 
2014)4, which has been engaged as an outsider in key Arctic governance 
structures since the late 1980s (Depledge 2013). The fourth part situates 
the Arctic Circle within the broader assemblage of Arctic governance. We 
conclude by considering how thinking about ‘bazaar’ governance enlivens 
our understanding of the emerging Arctic governance regime, and how 
a process-tracing approach might shed light on the circulation of knowl-
edge and ideas within this bazaar arrangement.
146 D. DEPLEDGE AND K. DODDS
ArctIc GovernAnce: A MosAIc of cooperAtIon?
The first circumpolar Arctic agreement was signed in 1973 by Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union, and the USA to promote interna-
tional cooperation for the sustainable management of polar bear popu-
lations. This was followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a host 
of institutional developments primarily centred on promoting interna-
tional scientific cooperation and environmental protection, including 
the International Arctic Science Committee (1990), the International 
Arctic Social Sciences Association (1990), the NF (1991), the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (1991), the BEAC (1993) and the 
Arctic Council (1996). In addition to these regional and sub-regional 
instruments, parts of the Arctic are also subject to a number of inter-
national governance regimes including the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen, the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and 
its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL), the Oslo–Paris agreements on marine 
pollution (OSPAR), the 1975 Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)’s Polar Code, which is expected to enter 
into force in January 2017.5
This dizzying array of international agreements, policy declarations, 
legal instruments and sub-regional/sub-national organisations together 
constitute what Oran Young (2005, p. 10) has called a ‘mosaic of issue- 
specific arrangements’, which collectively constitute the prevailing Arctic 
governance regime complex (Young 2012). Other scholars have offered 
similar ways of framing Arctic governance as a patchwork of formal and 
informal arrangements that operate at different levels (international, 
regional, sub-regional, national, sub-national) (Stokke 2011). The broad 
ambition of these international institutionalists was summed up in the final 
report of the Arctic Governance Project, which called for greater efforts to 
ensure that ‘all these entities are joined together in a mutually supportive 
manner to form an interlocking suite of governance systems for the Arctic’ 
(Arctic Governance Project 2010, p. 13; see also Chap. 5 by Humrich, 
this volume).
Such an understanding of the prevailing Arctic governance regime com-
plex emphasises the complementarity that exists between its constituent 
parts, as well as the possibility of developing new issue-specific arrange-
ments to plug any remaining gaps (Koivurova and Molenaar  2009). 
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The core logic to grasp here is that the Arctic governance regime complex 
is constructed from the sum of its parts. As such, despite the very different 
arrangements that exist from the international level to the sub-national 
level, they are all understood to retain some semblance of common pur-
pose—namely, to promote peace and cooperation in the Arctic.
While such an approach is useful for making sense of the way in which 
the prevailing Arctic governance regime complex is constituted, we 
argue that the debate around Arctic governance could be enlivened in 
two ways. The first is to emphasise the possibility that different gover-
nance arrangements may facilitate, interfere with, and contest one another 
(see also Ingimundarson 2014). The most obvious example of this came 
when the five Arctic Ocean littoral states (USA, Canada, Russia, Denmark 
and Norway), independently of the other three Arctic states (Finland, 
Sweden, Iceland), jointly issued the 2008 ‘Ilulissat Declaration’. While 
the Declaration itself was intended to reinforce the maritime rights of the 
five littoral states at a time of growing global interest in the Arctic, others 
questioned whether such a move might undermine the cohesion of the 
Arctic Council by excluding three Arctic states, let alone others who had 
a legitimate interest in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean (Staalesen 
2010; Weidemann 2014). Similarly, while all of the Arctic states have 
since emphasised the primacy of the Arctic Council in Arctic governance 
arrangements, its power to determine outcomes in the Arctic is severely 
restricted by its ‘soft’ law and forum-like character, and the need to defer 
to other international regimes on key aspects of governance relating, for 
example, to shipping, fisheries and pollution (Ingimundarson 2014; see 
also Chap. 6 by Selin, this volume).
In highlighting these conflicts, we do not mean to suggest that Arctic 
governance is chaotic, only to emphasise that there are multiple sites of 
action (and inaction) in the Arctic and we should be careful about over- 
determining the role of formal institutions and legal regimes, such as the 
Arctic Council and UNCLOS, per se. Related to this, the second way in 
which we hope to enliven the debate around Arctic governance is by high-
lighting the need to explore a wider array of arrangements, which empha-
sises the role of both performance and place, and not just an ill-defined set 
of actors and institutions. In describing actors and institutions relevant to 
Arctic governance, it seems normal to invoke a laundry list of international 
regimes such as UNCLOS, circumpolar bodies such as the Arctic Council, 
sub-regional groupings such as BEAC, and non-state organisations such as 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). The broad array of actors included 
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under the umbrella of ‘Arctic governance’ has also been extended to 
include the University of the Arctic, which is described on its website as a 
cooperative network of universities, colleges, research institutes and other 
organisations concerned with education and research in and about the 
North. However, international forums such as the annual Arctic Frontiers 
are rarely, if ever, acknowledged, despite the fact that they are regular sites 
of interaction and performance, involving an array of Arctic stakehold-
ers, including government officials from Arctic and non-Arctic states. At 
the same time, such forums often refer to themselves as distinct sites. For 
example, the 2016 Arctic Frontiers conference website contends that ‘The 
Arctic is a global crossroads between commercial and environmental inter-
ests’,6 and pointedly does not refer to the Arctic Council.
The emergence of the Arctic Circle has further complicated this picture 
as many seem to regard it as a rival organisation to the Arctic Council, 
even though it is essentially just another site for the exchange of knowl-
edge and ideas about the future of the Arctic, albeit one which receives 
far more media attention due to the presence of high-profile individuals 
such as a President Grímsson and major sponsors (e.g., Google). Again, 
we are not trying to argue that we should understand every site and space 
of discussion about the Arctic as part of Arctic governance—while this 
might be the case, boundaries always need to be delimited. At the same 
time, however, we must be careful not to adopt a ‘pick and mix’ approach 
whereby the Arctic Circle, for example, is treated as an institution of Arctic 
governance, while Arctic Frontiers is ignored. Here too, our notion of 
‘bazaar’ governance could be useful as it emphasises form over function—
what is common to the multiple sites of Arctic governance is that they all 
function as sites in which ideas are more or less effectively exchanged. Our 
examination of the Arctic Circle, as with other sites of Arctic governance, 
then, should therefore perhaps be more concerned with the form in which 
different ideas about the Arctic are exchanged.
BAzAAr GovernAnce
In 1978, Clifford Geertz explored how ideas from anthropology and eco-
nomics could be combined to shed further light on the study of peasant 
market systems, or what Geertz calls ‘bazaar economies’ (Geertz 1978). In 
his discussion of bazaars in Morocco, he highlights two types of bazaar—
the permanent (consisting of a designated trade quarter) and the periodic 
(which is more mobile and product specific)—which  individuals are free 
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to move between in order to secure the best deal on various traded items. 
The bazaar has a number of distinctive characteristics which relate to form 
rather than function—it is not simply the exchange of goods that matters 
but the ways in which information about prices flows through the bazaar 
affecting choices about what prices to buy and sell at. As Geertz (1978, 
p. 29) notes, in the bazaar, ‘information is poor, scarce, mal-distributed, 
inefficiently communicated and intensely valued’. Participation in the 
bazaar requires a search ‘for information that one lacks and the protec-
tion of information one has’ as buyers and sellers contend with known 
unknowns such as market demand, pricing and product provenance 
(Geertz 1978, p.  29). Luck and privileged information play important 
roles in managing these uncertainties, as do skilful bargaining (which may 
initially involve price/supply testing and become more intensive when it 
comes to actual transaction), experienced brokers and trusted client/sup-
plier relationships.
To navigate the bazaar, participants must therefore search for signs and 
clues about what is about to happen and where. This search can be made 
more or less difficult by the structure of the bazaar, but is also shaped by 
processes of clientalisation. This relates to the potential for lasting rela-
tionships to emerge between buyers and sellers on the basis of mutual 
trust. This also enables the seller to direct more energy towards ‘potential’ 
buyers, as he or she already has a number of secure customers, while the 
buyer can also spend less energy searching for the best price. However, 
it also partitions the bazaar by creating relationships between buyers and 
sellers based on ‘those in the know’, meaning that new arrivals to the 
bazaar may be far more exposed than regular participants to the vagaries 
of information flows.
In the context of the contemporary governance of the Arctic region, we 
posit the idea that the Arctic Circle is ‘bazaar-like’ in that it too involves 
imperfect exchanges of information, which in turn have the potential to 
impact the extent to which certain kinds of knowledge (or knowledge 
about certain things) gain currency at the expense of others. To reflect on 
the earlier quote from Grímsson, when forums such as the Arctic Circle 
bring together ‘institutional and governmental representatives, political 
and policy leaders, scientists and experts, activists and indigenous peoples’, 
it is not so that these actors can negotiate a common voice, but rather to 
give different stakeholders the opportunity to set out their ‘stalls’ and mar-
ket themselves as legitimate Arctic actors capable of offering key insights 
into indigenous, economic, cultural, technological and political activities 
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in the region. At the Arctic Circle, these stalls take a variety of forms, from 
plenaries to workshops, breakout sessions, private meetings, drinks recep-
tions, and dinners in restaurants. Each year, the build-up to Arctic Circle 
begins with various interested stakeholders attempting to secure their 
stall for the forthcoming conference—to become ‘stall- holders’. This is 
achieved by submitting proposals to the ‘organisers’, which itself requires 
would-be stall-holders to convince the organisers that there will be a mar-
ket at the Arctic Circle for their ideas.7
In terms of the ideas being marketed and exchanged, a number of 
countries including the UK, France, Japan and Italy were present to mar-
ket themselves as legitimate and engaged Arctic actors. Businesses such as 
Polarisk (a political risk research and consultancy firm) advertised more 
traditional wares such as consultancy services and technologies, and high-
lighted commercial opportunities for investment, infrastructure and trade. 
Other organisations such as the West Nordic Council and the World 
Economic Forum attended to promote awareness about their activities 
in the Arctic. Academics also held a number of sessions to present and 
debate their research findings, hoping perhaps that the Arctic Circle would 
increase their exposure to other potentially interested actors.
For those who win the right to set out their stalls at the Arctic Circle, 
the next challenge is to gain attention. Stall placement matters and it is 
in negotiating these placements that a stall-holder’s capital, skill, indus-
triousness, luck and privilege are tested. The biggest prize on offer is to 
make it into the plenary programme (especially for the morning sessions) 
where stall-holders will likely gain the most coverage. Here, there is a clear 
advantage for those stall-holders who already have close relationships with 
the organisers (who may be long-standing clients) or been able to market 
their ideas effectively in advance. Countries such as the UK, China, Japan 
and France can also offer other ‘sweeteners’ to the organisers, such as 
the attendance of VIP diplomats who can enhance the reputation of the 
Bazaar (e.g., the Arctic Circle in 2015 was attended by President François 
Hollande of France), as well as other kinds of endorsements (e.g., letters 
of support8).
Plenary sessions are held in the atmospheric main auditorium of the 
Harpa conference centre in Reykjavik on the basis that these sessions are 
expected to generate the most interest. The main auditorium is the largest 
and busiest area of the Arctic Circle ‘bazaar’, and also the best furnished 
in terms of décor and lighting. The auditorium is also well-positioned to 
pick up ‘passing trade’ as free food and drink is made available just outside. 
BAZAAR GOVERNANCE: SITUATING THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 151
At the same time, it is expected that buyers will look at the plenary sessions 
first on the understanding that this is where the premium information will 
be sold. One is more likely to encounter a VIP, such as a government min-
ister, in the plenary session, and this in turn may attract other high-profile 
audience members (indeed it is perhaps less likely that high-profile figures 
would bother to attend the Arctic Circle without an attractive audience to 
engage). The symbolism of the plenary therefore creates a mutual under-
standing between buyers and sellers that this is where the best information 
will be made available. For those that do not make it into the plenary, the 
risk they face is that their own stalls will be marginalised, sited somewhere 
else on the multiple floors of the Harpa building, or in other buildings 
altogether.
The stall-holders have to adopt different marketing strategies to ensure 
information about what they are selling is made available across the 
bazaar. Social media, word of mouth, enticing session titles and signpost-
ing (directing people to their stalls), all assume far greater importance, 
while a degree of luck is also needed. Of course, the ‘buyers’ also face an 
information challenge. Upon arriving at Arctic Circle, everyone is pre-
sented with a programme containing a list of all the stalls (sessions) that 
will be open over the course of the conference. At an event the size of 
Arctic Circle, participants are forced to choose between multiple stalls 
(there were 78 sessions across the three days) as they cannot attend them 
all. Here too, information is at a premium as the programme only details 
titles, timings, sites and speakers. With only imperfect information avail-
able, social media, word of mouth, title wording, and speaker reputations 
all assume greater importance as buyers navigate the bazaar in search of 
the most valuable information. At the same time, sellers are forced into 
thinking about how best to attract key buyers to their stalls (i.e., those 
people they are most keen to influence with their information).
the uK deleGAtIon In reyKjAvIK: A BIzArre 
perforMAnce In octoBer 2014?
The strategies and performances elicited from those attending the Arctic 
Circle, whether as stall-holders or buyers (in many cases participants actu-
ally play both roles in the course of the conference) are critical to the flow 
and exchange of information in the bazaar. In the build-up to the 2014 
Arctic Circle, the UK delegation was particularly successful, managing to 
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secure two stalls to be open on different days during Arctic Circle, while 
most other participants only managed to get one stall. Moreover, one of 
these stalls had gained a prized plenary position. The UK was not unique 
in this regard as national delegations from France, Singapore, and Japan 
were also given plenary stalls. Here, privilege appeared to play an impor-
tant role. Since these delegations represented states, there was a need for 
the organisers to recognise their primacy as holders of premium informa-
tion (with states still regarded as the primary actors in IR).
However, the UK was unique among these countries in being granted 
a second stall in a ‘breakout’ session, which would give the UK delega-
tion a further opportunity to sell their wares. Among these ‘wares’ was 
the claim that the UK was a legitimate and active player in the Arctic. The 
sessions were also used to demonstrate the contributions that UK com-
mercial actors and scientists/social scientists could make in the Arctic. To 
have those two sessions, moreover, was a privilege that one might surmise 
was either related to the close relationship between the head of the UK 
delegation, James Gray MP, and President Grímsson or to the fact that the 
UK delegation was able to convince the organisers that it had more infor-
mation to sell (or most likely some measure of both). What was perhaps 
not anticipated by the UK delegation was that this second stall would be 
sited in a difficult-to-find room at the back of the Harpa building. Given 
the impression made by the UK delegation during the plenary (discussed 
below), there was also a palpable sense of fatigue about the UK delega-
tion among other Arctic participants—or at the very least, a sense that 
all the ‘good stuff’ had already been sold during the plenary. In terms of 
audience numbers, the ‘breakout’ stall attracted far less interest than the 
‘plenary’ stall. Of those that did turn up, there was a sense within the UK 
delegation that these were not necessarily the people that they were pri-
marily interested in selling to.
The actual performance of the UK delegation at the Arctic Circle is 
also worthy of note. It is fair to say that the UK delegation made a big 
impression, especially during the plenary session. The strategy adopted by 
the UK delegation had multiple dimensions to it, involving nine speak-
ers representing the UK government, UK parliament and British busi-
nesses giving quick-fire presentations; a projection of a giant Union Jack 
emblazoned on a screen behind them; the setting up of multiple banners 
by the stage advertising the UK as ‘Great’; and the handing out of glossy 
brochures (also emblazoned with the Union Jack) to prospective buyers 
in the audience.
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Somewhat controversially perhaps, the poppy worn by many UK citi-
zens each year in the run-up to Armistice Day in the UK (which coincided 
with the Arctic Circle) also ended up being enrolled in the performance of 
marking out the size of the British delegation/stall which dwarfed all oth-
ers. All of these actions were part of a broader strategy to sell the view that 
the UK had both a legitimate and an active interest in the environmental, 
social, economic and geopolitical changes currently affecting the Arctic 
region—essentially as a response to a gauntlet thrown down by President 
Grímsson in 2013 when he told an audience in London that the UK was 
not doing enough to be taken seriously as a player in Arctic affairs, reflect-
ing broader criticism that the UK has not always been as engaged with 
Arctic affairs as it could have been (Morrell 2013).
But how was this performance received by others attending the Arctic 
Circle? In other words, did the idea sell? In the coffee breaks and network-
ing events that followed the UK ‘plenary’, participants at the Arctic Circle 
could be heard joking that the UK delegation might have lacked subtlety 
and maybe even went a little too far in trying to sell itself in Reykjavik. 
After the event, somewhat ironically, one academic blogger observed that 
the UK delegation had come across as a ‘trade mission’—a peddler of 
more traditional goods and services rather than of the sorts of knowledge 
and ideas that stall-holders at the Arctic Circle were supposed to be sell-
ing according to Grímsson’s vision (Exner-Pirot 2014). Nevertheless, the 
official feedback from within the UK delegation was that the UK had 
performed well, achieving its mission to sell the idea that the UK was an 
important actor in the Arctic, and creating the conditions going forward 
for the UK to continue participating in the marketplace of ideas about 
what the future should hold for the region.
At the same time, it was impossible to avoid the feeling that delega-
tions from other countries, Arctic as well as non-Arctic, were also reflect-
ing on the fact that they had perhaps missed an opportunity to set out a 
bigger stall in Reykjavik. A delegate from Japan (which opened its own 
‘plenary’ stall the next day) even commented that Japanese parliamentar-
ians would follow the UK example when the Arctic Circle next convened 
in October 2015, suggesting that the strategy used by the UK delegation 
had sold, even if the content had not. At the 2015 Arctic Circle meet-
ing, for example, Japan released its first Arctic policy and undertook a 
provisional translation of the policy so that it could reach a wider inter-
national audience (Government of Japan 2015). A further measure of the 
degree to which the UK delegation was seen to have adopted a successful 
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strategy would be to see whether other delegations use the UK model 
when setting out their stalls at the next Arctic Circle meeting in 2015. 
Shortly after the Arctic Circle meeting in 2014, France announced and 
subsequently confirmed that President François Hollande would lead the 
French delegation to the Arctic Circle in 2015. The French president 
ended up delivering the keynote speech to the 2015 meeting. In contrast, 
the UK went for a far more discrete presence, perhaps reflecting that 
there is only so much buying and selling one can do in the Arctic from 
year to year, at least until there is a further significant increase in human 
activity in the region.
sItuAtInG the ArctIc cIrcle In An ArctIc 
GovernAnce BAzAAr
Finally, it is worth commenting on one other dimension to the Arctic 
Circle ‘bazaar’. In this chapter, we have primarily focused on the actors 
that brought their stalls to Reykjavik. However, in the broader contexts of 
debates about Arctic governance, it is worth noting that the Arctic Circle 
also constitutes a stall within the wider bazaar in which Arctic governance 
is negotiated; a bazaar in which the Arctic Circle ‘stall’ sits alongside other 
stalls ranging from the intergovernmental (e.g., the Arctic Council), to 
the international (e.g., the IMO), the sub-regional (e.g., the BEAC), the 
sub- national (e.g., the ICC), and other forums such as Arctic Frontiers and 
the International Arctic Forum. In fact, at the Arctic Council Ministerial 
meeting in 2013, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, responded 
with his own sales pitch when he argued that the Kiruna Declaration, as it 
pertained to new observers, had confirmed the Arctic Council’s primacy 
globally (Myers 2013).
Nevertheless, while most would acknowledge that the Arctic Council is 
indeed the primary ‘stall’ in the Arctic bazaar, it is not the only purveyor of 
relevance to Arctic governance. Although the Arctic Council has sought 
to transform its stall by becoming less exclusive, for instance, by accredit-
ing more observers and establishing the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) 
in September 2014, there are political limits to what the Arctic Council 
can sell (including discussions on defence and security), creating demand 
for other stalls—such as the Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers—which are 
capable of building different networks of information exchange between 
international, national, sub-national, non-governmental and commercial 
actors (Steinberg and Dodds 2015).
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While we have used the term ‘bazaar governance’ to analytically grasp 
what we think is at stake when it comes to making sense of Arctic gover-
nance, it is also motivated by a desire to return to some first-order prin-
ciples in terms of why governance matters. From setting out ‘grounding 
rules’ for participants to decision-making processes, terms like ‘Arctic 
governance’ should be treated cautiously not only because the word ‘gov-
ernance’ is contested as is ‘Arctic’ in terms of what it encapsulates and 
whether there are some parties (often assumed to be state parties) more 
than others who have a right/capacity to appropriate/inhabit that space in 
the first place. As the Government of Japan’s Arctic policy notes,
‘Some Arctic states, with a view toward securing their national interests 
and protecting their territories, have become active in the area of national 
defense. Moves toward expanding military presence may have an impact on 
the international security environment. In this way, changes in the Arctic 
environment have political, economic, and social effects, not only in the 
Arctic but also globally. Resulting opportunities and issues are attracting 
the attention of the global community, both of Arctic and non-Arctic states’ 
(Government of Japan 2015, pp. 1–2).
conclusIon
In this chapter, we have sought to introduce the idea that the Arctic Circle 
Assembly has taken the form of an annual ‘bazaar’ where knowledge and 
ideas about the Arctic are ‘bought’ and ‘sold’ by a wide range of stake-
holders from both within and beyond the Arctic region. Within the bazaar, 
these stakeholders become ‘stall-holders’, competing with one another for 
attention in order to position themselves as key knowledge brokers in the 
debate about the future of the Arctic region. They must rely on a combi-
nation of capital, skill, industriousness, luck, and privilege. After all, while 
it is expensive to attend Arctic Circle (unless you are speaking, a volunteer, 
a student, or part of the media), it is cheaper to attend than other Arctic 
events such as Arctic Frontiers in Norway. Moreover, although stalls must 
be negotiated with the organisers, the conference is open to everyone (in 
contrast to the Arctic Council where participation is strictly limited to 
member states, indigenous Permanent Participants, and observers).
At the same time, privilege still matters since having good relations with 
key figures such as President Grímsson and major sponsors help to ensure 
maximum exposure and exclusive access (Guggenheim, e.g., hosted an 
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invite-only drinks reception on one evening). In 2014, the UK delegation 
experienced both sides of this coin, gaining a high-level exposure in the 
plenary session, but attracting far less attention during the breakout ses-
sion. The overall view from within the delegation was that the experi-
ence was a positive one. Despite existing commercial, cultural and political 
ties to the region, the UK is still worried about being perceived as an 
‘outsider’, especially in those contexts where the UK has either commer-
cial interests or domestic environmental opinion to contend with. Thus, 
although the UK has been careful to respect the sovereignty of the Arctic 
states and the primacy of the Arctic Council (where the UK’s own voice is 
limited), the Arctic Circle provided a valuable opportunity for the UK to 
‘market’ its Arctic credentials in a display of flag-waving and showmanship 
that would have been impossible in nearly every other Arctic forum.
At the same time, we have also argued that the Arctic Circle is emerging 
as a stall in its own right, as part of a broader bazaar of Arctic governance 
in which the Arctic Circle competes with all kinds of other institutions and 
forums to push forward ideas about Arctic governance. The leadership 
of President Grímsson, with support from the Icelandic government, has 
helped to promote the Arctic Circle as the stall of choice for both global 
and marginalised stakeholders who have been excluded from other stalls 
such as the Arctic Council. Already, the Arctic Council has countered this 
challenge (whether intentionally or not): first by granting observer status 
to an increasing number of states, and second by establishing the AEC. In 
Norway, the organisers of Arctic Frontiers may be feeling the pressure as 
well, not least because Reykjavik is more accessible than Tromsø both 
geographically and financially. It seems noteworthy that in 2013, there 
was no official Norwegian, Swedish, or Finnish representation (at least in 
the plenary sessions) at Arctic Circle. In 2014, Norway was absent again. 
As this chapter suggests, this kind of bargaining and competition (and the 
dynamism implied), both between Arctic stakeholders and sites of Arctic 
stakeholder interaction, appear as neglected aspects of Arctic governance.
We suggest that an avenue for further research of the Arctic Circle ‘bazaar’ 
would be to explore how far ideas and relations that have been ‘bought’ and 
‘sold’ in Reykjavik since 2013 have travelled since. A second avenue for future 
research would be to survey both stall-holders and attendees about their expe-
riences at the Arctic Circle, in order to delimit more clearly what it is they are 
seeking to ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ at the forum, the strategies they deploy and the dif-
ficulties they face in achieving desired outcomes. The emergence of the Arctic 
Circle has helped to foreground these concerns, while adopting a concept of 
the ‘bazaar’ seems to us a useful way to begin addressing their neglect.
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notes
 1. Others in Iceland have, however, been sceptical about strengthening ties 
with China as indicated by the government’s decision to reject a proposal by 
a multimillionaire Chinese property developer to build a huge tourist resort 
on a large tract of unused land in the northeast corner of Iceland.
 2. A full list of Arctic Circle partners is available on the initiative’s webpages at 
http://arcticcircle.org/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
 3. Examples include the Norwegian-funded ‘Geopolitics in the Arctic: A 
Changing International Landscape’, London: Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI), 14 April 2015; the joint Swedish/Finnish- funded ‘Forum: 
Arctic Climate Change & Security’, London: International Institute for 
Security Studies (IISS), 2012–2014; and the US-funded ‘The Future of the 
Arctic’, London: The British Library, 16 March 2015.
 4. Duncan Depledge gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided 
by the Mamont Foundation for this.
 5. For a full list of Arctic governance agreements, readers should consult the 
webpages of the Arctic Governance Project at http://arcticgovernance.cus-
tompublish.com/compendium.137742.en.html (last accessed 08 December 
2015).
 6. See http://www.arcticfrontiers.com/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
 7. The Arctic Circle organisers emphasise a determination to be as inclusive as 
possible in this regard, in contrast to other conferences such as Arctic 
Frontiers which set a specific ‘theme’ each year.
 8. The News section of the Arctic Circle is littered with examples of letters of 
support, including recently, from President Xi Jiping of China and Chancellor 
Angela Merkel of Germany.
references
Arctic Governance Project. (2010). Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformative 
Change: Critical Questions, Governance Principles, Ways Forward. Report of 
the Arctic Governance Project. 14 April 2010.
Borgerson, S. (2008). Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications 
of Global Warming. Foreign Affairs, March/April, 63–77.
Council on Foreign Relations. (2013). The Future of the Arctic: A New Global 
Playing Field. Transcript. Council on Foreign Relations, 16 April 2013.
Depledge, D. (2013). Assembling a (British) Arctic. The Polar Journal, 3(1), 
163–177.
Dodds, K., & Ingimundarson, V. (2012). Territorial Nationalism and Arctic 
Geopolitics: Iceland as an Arctic Coastal State. The Polar Journal, 2(1), 
21–37.
158 D. DEPLEDGE AND K. DODDS
Exner-Pirot, H. (2014, November 10). The British Invasion – The Arctic Circle 
and Observer States. Eye on the Arctic. Available online: http://www.rcinet.ca/
eye-on-the-arctic/2014/11/10/blog-the-british-invasion-the-arctic-circle-
and- observer-states/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Geertz, C. (1978). The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant 
Marketing. The American Economic Review, 68(2), 28–32.
Government of Japan. (2015). Japan’s Arctic Policy. The Headquarters for Ocean 
Policy, 16th October 2015. Unofficial English translation available online: 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1883/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Gudjonsson, H., & Nielsson, E.T. (2015, April 22). Iceland’s Arctic Awaken-
ing. World Policy Blog. Available online: http://www.worldpolicy.org/
blog/2015/04/22/iceland%E2%80%99s-arctic-awakening (last accessed 08 
December 2015).
Ingimundarson, V. (2014). Managing a Contested Region: The Arctic Council 
and the Politics of Arctic Governance. The Polar Journal, 4(1), 183–198.
Koivurova, T., & Molenaar, E.J. (2009). International Governance and the 
Regulation of the Marine Arctic. Three Reports Prepared for the WWF 
International Arctic Programme. Oslo: WWF International Arctic Programme.
Koring, P. (2013). New Arctic Group Gives Canada Political Competition. The 
Globe and Mail. Available online: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/new-arctic-group-gives-canada-political-competition/article 
11243970/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Lund, E. (2015, March 31). Iceland and the EU: Some Like It Lukewarm. The 
Arctic Journal. Available online: http://arcticjournal.com/politics/1436/
some-it-lukewarm (last accessed 08 December 2015).
McGwin, K. (2015, February 01). For Alaskans, Arctic Politics is Local Politics. 
The Arctic Journal. Available online: http://arcticjournal.com/politics/1298/
alaskans-arctic-politics-local-politics (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010, February 18). Iceland Protests a Meeting of 5 
Arctic Council Member States in Canada. Press Release. Available online: 
http://www.mfa.is/news-and-publications/nr/5434 (last accessed 08 
December 2015).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013, April 15). Iceland First European Country to 
Sign Free Trade Agreement with China. Press Release. Available online: http://
www.mfa.is/news-and-publications/nr/7655 (last accessed 08 December 
2015).
Morrell, P. (2013). Poles Apart – A One-day International Conference to Bring 
Industry and Science in the Polar Regions Closer Together. Official Report. 
London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
Myers, S.L. (2013, May 15). Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, 
Including China. New York Times. Available online: http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-six-members- 
including-china.html (last accessed 08 December 2015).
BAZAAR GOVERNANCE: SITUATING THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 159
Nunatsiaq News. (2013, May 15). Greenland Premier Boycotts the Arctic Council 
in ‘Drastic’ Protest. Nunatsiaq News. Available online: http://www.nunat-
siaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674greenland_walks_away_from_the_arctic_
council/ (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Quaile, I. (2013). All Eyes on the Arctic Council. Deutsche Welle. Available online: 
http://www.dw.com/en/all-eyes-on-the-arctic-council/a-16811193 (last 
accessed 08 December 2015).
Staalesen, A. (2010, March 30). Formalizing the Arctic G5. BarentsObserver. 
Available online: http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/politics/formalizing- 
 arctic-g5 (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Steinberg, P.E., & Dodds, K. (2015). The Arctic Council After Kiruna. Polar 
Record, 51(1), 108–110.
Stokke, O.S. (2011). Environmental Security in the Arctic: The Case for Multilevel 
Governance. International Journal, 66(4), 835–848.
Tatlow, D.K. (2012, October 05). China and the Northern Rivalry. New York 
Times. Available online: http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/
china-and-the-northern-great-game/?_r=0 (last accessed 08 December 2015).
Webb, R. (2013, April 15). Iceland President Sounds Climate Alarm Demanding 
Global Attention, Action at NPC Club Luncheon. The National Press Club. 
Available online: https://www.press.org/news-multimedia/news/iceland-
president- sounds-climate-alarm-demanding-global-attention-and-action (last 
accessed 08 December 2015).
Weidemann, L. (2014). International Governance of the Arctic Marine 
Environment: With Particular Emphasis on High Seas Fisheries. Heidelberg, 
New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer Cham.
Young, O.R. (2005). Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theatre to Mosaic of 
Cooperation. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations, 11(1), 9–15.
Young O.R. (2008). The Architecture of Global Environmental Governance: 
Bringing Science to Bear on Policy. Global Environmental Politics, 8(1), 14–32.
Young, O.R. (2012). Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: 
Current Status and Next Steps. The Polar Journal, 2(2), 391–407.
160 D. DEPLEDGE AND K. DODDS
